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ESOPs and the Limits of 
Fractionalized Ownership 
Jedidiah J. Kroncke† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2016, business headlines reported three different stories 
about companies taking non-traditional steps in compensating their 
employees. The owner of Chobani, the popular yogurt producer, had 
given away ten percent of the company’s shares to its employees. These 
shares were worth over $100,000 for Chobani’s most recent hires and 
reached over $1,000,000 in value for its more senior workers.1 A few 
months earlier, Southwest Airlines had announced that it would be dis-
tributing close to a third of its record $2.2 billion profit in 2015 to its 
employees, representing fifteen percent of their total compensation.2 
Near the same time, the U.S. Department of Labor had celebrated the 
achievements of the New Era Windows Cooperative in Chicago, worker-
owned business which was growing after years of struggle emerging 
from the bankruptcy of its earlier employer-owner.3 What all three sto-
ries shared in common was that they each garnered commentary as rep-
resenting some variation of “capitalism done right.” The popular reso-
nance of this theme among these different workplace practices reflects 
the significant hunger for alternatives to what many consider to the 
ongoing crisis of economic legitimacy in the United States and around 
the globe. 
Across a myriad of countries and political regimes, the twentieth 
century has witnessed a recurrent rise and fall of economic ideologies. 
 
 † Professor of Law, Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School at São Paulo (Direito GV). 
 1 Joseph Blasi, What Chobani’s Employee Stock Ownership Plan Means for the Middle Class?, 
HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (May 2, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-blasi/what-chobanis 
-employee-st_b_9815020.html [https://perma.cc/2Q96-3HA9]. 
 2 Becky Yerak, Southwest Profit-Sharing Checks Hit a Record $620 Million, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 
11, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-southwest-profit-sharing-0212-biz-2-201602 
11-story.html [https://perma.cc/7MCR-3P6Z]. 
 3 Brendan Martin, The Promise of Worker-Ownership, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. BLOG (Feb. 16, 
2016), https://blog.dol.gov/2016/02/16/the-promise-of-worker-ownership [https://perma.cc/7V5W-C 
QYP]; see also Astra Taylor, Hope and Ka-Ching: Workers of the World, Apply Here, 25 BAFFLER 
128, 128 (2014). 
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The rapidity of these cycles has only increased following deepening 
global interconnection and the hurtling speed of capital mobility. The 
organizing logic of the Cold War offered a rough binary of political affil-
iation that masked quite significant variations of capitalism, but the 
Cold War’s end has yet to result in movement towards any truly global 
ideology.4 Herein, the attractiveness of “Third Way” conceptualizations 
of economic development promised justice without revolution by com-
bining the presumed benefits of free markets and various forms of social 
security.5 The limited traction of these “Third Way” paradigms has been 
matched by cyclical attractions to more centralized, state-led capital-
ism, in what, until recently, had popularly been called the “BRICS” na-
tions.6 
What is striking is that stories like those of Chobani, Southwest, 
and New Era Window draw on an ideal of “employee ownership” that 
has co-existed during all of these pendulum-like swings in economic ide-
ology. Though rarely at the core of any national economic project, em-
ployee ownership has always managed to find proponents across politi-
cal divides, and has at worst faced indifference rather than outright 
political opposition. The ways in which notions of employee ownership 
are expressed vary greatly, emphasizing assorted aspects of these re-
cent stories—direct ownership of corporate shares, robust profit-shar-
ing or labor-management. Each of these emphases has historical roots 
as deep as industrial capitalism itself, from nineteenth century utopian 
collectives to today’s more fashionable debates over “financial inclu-
sion.” 
For all their variations, what these practices share in common is 
the notion that it is not income inequality per se that is most troubling, 
but wealth inequality. Proponents of such argue that income is only an 
imperfect indicator of the central dysfunction of a maldistribution of 
capital, or the benefits of capital. The politically unobjectionable status 
of employee ownership is derived in part from that fact that it repre-
sents a corrective to capitalism rather than a fundamental challenge. 
At the same time, the seriousness of employee ownership as a central 
objective of economic reform has been limited by the perception that it 
 
 4 Not surprisingly, Henry Hansmann’s own work on employee ownership followed his inter-
est in alternative forms of economic organization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. E.g., Henry 
Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Eco-
nomic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990). 
 5 Shaun Wilson & Ben Spies-Butcher, After New Labour: Political and Policy Consequences 
of Welfare State Reforms in the United Kingdom and Australia, 37 POL’Y STUD. 408 (2016). 
 6 THE RISE OF THE BRICS IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (Vai Io Lo & Mary Hiscock 
eds., 2014). 
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is difficult, if not impossible, to replicate or scale it to a degree of sys-
temic importance. 
Perhaps no country represents the persistence of employee owner-
ship’s simultaneous popularity and minority status than the United 
States. Though often held out as the model free market economy with a 
comparatively weak welfare state, the U.S. has the highest levels of em-
ployee ownership in the world, reaching approximately fifteen percent 
of its total workforce.7 In the broadest strokes, this level of employee 
ownership reflects the particular relevance and durability of what could 
be called “economic republicanism” in U.S. history.8 
As political republicanism seeks to restrain the arbitrary exercise 
of power by representative government, economic republicanism sees 
the exertion of arbitrary power in the economic realm as a co-equal en-
emy of liberty.9 In fact, the presumption that political and economic 
freedom are intertwined was the predominant assumption of most 
every social theorist, captured by the traditional use of the term “polit-
ical economy,” before the disciplinary divisions that emerged in the 
twentieth century, especially in economics.10 Following this earlier tra-
dition, economic republicans argued that the equality of interdepend-
ence between citizens in the workplace is as foundational to human 
freedom as it is in political elections, with the synchronic benefit that 
economic decentralization greatly facilitates political equality.11 This 
integrated notion of public and private citizenship reflects an under-
standing that the process of economic production is not simply a utili-
tarian exercise in wealth creation, but one that necessarily implicates 
fundamental notions of autonomy and dignity.12 Summarily, substan-
tive civic equality is impossible under conditions of acute economic 
equality,13 and generations of political philosophers have argued that 
 
 7 THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, 2015 ESOP COMPANY SURVEY (2015). 
 8 The concept has a far more complex historical lineage, as old as modern political economy 
itself. JEFF GATES, THE OWNERSHIP SOLUTION: TOWARD A SHARED CAPITALISM FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 14 (1998). (“[B]oth Adam Smith and Thomas Jefferson proposed radically decen-
tralized systems, along with a centralized government strong enough to ensure their decentraliza-
tion.”). The legacy of this tradition in the U.S. manifests itself in other contexts where forms of 
ownership are still state-subsidized, such as the mortgage interest deduction. See William Simon, 
Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991). 
 9 David Watkins, Republicanism at Work: Strategies for Supporting Resistance to Domination 
in the Workplaces, 4 SPECTRA 1, 1 (2015), https://spectrajournal.org/SPECTRA/article/view/239/ 
167 [https://perma.cc/F34T-6ZBG]. 
 10 MARY FURNER, ADVOCACY AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF 
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865-1905 (1975). 
 11 Infra section II.A. 
 12 Nien-He Hsieh, Justice at Work: Arguing for Property-Owning Democracy, 40 J. SOC. 
PHIL. 397 (2009). 
 13 “The most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to 
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political virtue are inextricably linked in the daily praxis of democratic 
life.14 
What divides proponents of employee ownership is the degree to 
which they place an antisubordination rationale at the heart of their 
project, and how far they seek to subvert the inherent power dynamics 
of commodified labor exchange.15 More radical forms of economic repub-
licanism declare that wage-labor is inextricably a form of dependency 
at odds with true economic freedom. Underlying this position is an un-
derstanding of the essentially coercive force of human biology, where 
participation in a labor market can never be truly voluntary unless al-
ternative means of self-sufficiency exist. 
Such differentiation has become more acute as the modern work-
place continues to blur the line between the public and private lives of 
workers, and technological advances offer up the prospect of almost 
complete workplace surveillance.16 Simultaneously, the precariousness 
of work has only increased across sectors of the U.S. economy, destabi-
lizing the traditionally more static boundaries of the corporation17 and 
policy preferences for facilitating workplace turnover.18 
As such, while Chobani, Southwest, and New Era Windows are 
grouped by some under flexible rubrics such as “financial inclusion,” in 
practice they disrupt the dominant paradigm of workplace governance 
to quite different degrees. Chobani offers workers a one-time voluntary 
grant of minority voting rights by a still majority owner; Southwest of-
fers no participatory rights through profit sharing; and New Era Win-
dows would appear to completely flatten the labor/capital hierarchy. If 
one takes seriously that a recurrent and longitudinal pattern of employ-
 
promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. The first question in respect to any 
political institutions is how far they tend to foster in the members of the community the various 
desirable qualities, moral and intellectual.” JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 39 (1869). 
 14 John Rawls’s investigation into the nature of a true “property-owning democracy” is one 
modern instantiation of this tradition, now developed by a range of thinkers concerned with the 
continued status differentiations of citizens who own capital versus those who contribute labor to 
an economy. Nien-He Hsieh, Work, Ownership and Productive Enfranchisement, in PROPERTY-
OWNING DEMOCRACY: RAWLS AND BEYOND 147 (Martin O’Neill & Thad Williamson eds., 2012). 
 15 Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579 
(2009). 
 16 Chris Bertram, Let It Bleed: Libertarianism and the Workplace, CROOKED TIMBER (July 1, 
2012), http://crookedtimber.org/2012/07/01/let-it-bleed-libertarianism-and-the-workplace/ [https:// 
perma.cc/6FN6-ZNPF]. 
 17 Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 
2012). 
 18 Jedidiah Kroncke, Law and the Hedonics of Development (forthcoming 2018). 
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ment insecurity and workplace subordination are not a true lived con-
dition of liberty, then these distinctions begin to challenge the utility of 
their common classification. 
Understanding these variations is a key next step to understanding 
the renewed interest in the past decade for reinterpreting the American 
traditional of economic republicanism. Legal scholars and political the-
orists alike have looked back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century to recover these ideals, notably in debates over the meaning of 
the Thirteenth Amendment.19 Most of these efforts focus on the anti-
subordination ethos of the Thirteenth Amendment and its implications 
for labor regulation.20 Yet, whatever social legitimacy these efforts may 
add to the political cause of promoting workplace reform, the finer de-
tails of developing working alternative institutions has remained the 
trickiest obstacle to overcome.21 
The aim of this paper will be to explore the tensions within the cat-
egory of “employee ownership” through the legal mechanism most re-
sponsible for the modern spread of employee ownership in the United 
States—the mid-twentieth century creation of the Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan (or ESOP). The article will present the history and cur-
rent state of ESOPs in the United States as evidencing two axes of what 
will be called the “employee ownership conundrum”: 1) the tension be-
tween gradualism and systemic reform and 2) the unsure relationship 
between antisubordination effects and ownership interests in the work-
place. The lens of the ESOP highlights these two particular tensions as 
the most acute example of the limitations of an intra-systemic reform 
that does not challenge any existing economic interests while also com-
pletely separating capital ownership from participatory logics in the 
workplace.22 
The consequence of this separation has led ESOP proponents into 
a cyclical struggle with critics who argue that existing minority em-
 
 19 E.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous 13th Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1459 (2012); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. 
L. REV. 669, 689 (2014). This interest is not entirely new, and has been explored in prior decades 
to varying degrees. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the 13th Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 437 (1989). 
 20 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 255 (2010); Rebecca E. Zietlow, A Positive Right to Free Labor, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
859 (2016). 
 21 ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, ENVISIONING REAL UTOPIAS 107–09 (2010). 
 22 This represents a private variation of what Marian Prado would call an “institutional by-
pass.” Mariana Mota Prado, Institutional Bypass: An Alternative for Developmental Reform (April 
19, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1815442 [https://perma.cc/TJE6-C 
PCS]. 
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ployee ownership (EO) levels in the United States are the natural con-
sequence of market dynamics. This cycle exists in an unproductive clash 
between recurrent econometric analyses without clearly demonstrated 
causal mechanisms by either side of the debate. Most critically for 
ESOP proponents, the limits of quantitative analysis have led to signif-
icant endogeneity issues which has obscured the fact that the promotion 
of ESOPs are not inequality reducing, but exacerbating as they reward 
extant winners in the labor market or already successful companies 
with pre-existing commitments to progressive workplaces.23 In tandem, 
the retreat to a language of efficiency by proponents has allowed EO 
critics to advance survivalist arguments which take for granted the 
wide-range of social and economic practices which shape and replicate 
existing patterns of workplace governance. 
The sum force of these distortions has reduced the employee own-
ership debate in the United States to battles over comparative corporate 
efficiency, and completely severed the link between ownership and re-
publicanism which motivates antisubordination critiques of the modern 
workplace. This emphasis has further led to an abstract focus on the 
formal structures of ownership, rather than the lived reality of work-
place decision-making. While more wide-spread and less unequal own-
ership of land and capital may facilitate the interdependent freedom 
that economic republicans imagine, such interdependence is always 
foundationally a matter of power. Property ownership may be a power-
ful proxy or indicia of personal autonomy and freedom, but it can be 
legally configured to promote neither. As such, the ESOP exposes the 
limits of property-centric versions on economic republicanism through 
its fractionalized version of corporate share ownership. 
The technical seriousness of the debate can serve as a salutary and 
needed antidote to the often utopian visions of worker governance ad-
vanced in debates on alternative workplace structures. Yet, to truly re-
alize the economic liberty sought by republican ideals will require a set 
of fundamental analytical shifts in ESOP scholarship specifically and 
EO scholarship more generally. 
 
 23 As explored later, the core issue here is that productive companies with existing participa-
tory cultures are more likely to adopt ESOPs as one of many wage substitutes and complements. 
Thus, marginal productivity effects, flatter wage structures, or other positive outcomes attributed 
to ESOPs are not reflective of the impact of ESOPs themselves but pre-existing conditions condu-
cive to their formation. 
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II. THE REGULATORY GENIUS OF THE ESOP 
A. Louis Kelso and the Desire for a New Capitalism 
The popularity of anti-feudal social theories in early American his-
tory generally involved variations of what today is commonly referred 
to as an “ownership society.”24 In the Revolutionary Era and throughout 
the nineteenth century, much of this idealism focused on the model of 
small independent agrarian farmers. This intertwined view of economic 
and political citizenship was seen as liberatory from the ancient re-
gimes of England and Europe and justified the exclusionary logic of re-
stricting political enfranchisement to land owners. As industrial capi-
talism overtook the logic of the late nineteenth century American 
economy, these ideals were challenged by the emergence of wage labor. 
The ideology of the early Republican Party reflected the uneasy conflict 
between the ideal of a morally free citizen as economically enfranchised 
and the subordination inherent in the commodification of labor.25 The 
older vision of a citizen body of free farmers possessing an equality of 
civil and economic resources could not survive in the new industrial eco-
nomic order which generated new lines of inequality among citizens in 
wealth, income, social standing, education, knowledge, occupational 
prestige, and authority.26 
Yet, the life of these ideals did not survive long past the early twen-
tieth century, submerged under the rapid rise of wage labor as the pre-
dominant condition of economic life for the majority of Americans.27 
However, the rise of industrial capitalism never fully deadened the life 
of economic republican ideals in the U.S.28 As the corporate form came 
to organize U.S. industrial activity in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, the aspiration that workers could themselves be owners was 
 
 24 See Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 25 ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970). 
 26 ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR AND 
REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2014). 
 27 No idea better represented the intensity of this conceptual turn than the theories of “scien-
tific management” espoused by Frederick Taylor, which wholly transformed the new industrial 
employee into another fungible input of economic production to be managed for maximized pro-
ductive output. See generally FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC 
MANAGEMENT (1911). 
 28 Contemporary scholars have often mined this era to recover some of these ideals, articulat-
ing notions of “social-republican property” or “civic-republicanism.” Others have similarly tried to 
recapture the religious roots of alternative economic theories tying together economic and political 
virtue. Simon, supra note 8; see Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic 
Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008); ADIN BALLOU, PRACTICAL CHRISTIAN 
SOCIALISM: A CONVERSATIONAL EXPOSITION OF THE TRUE SYSTEM OF HUMAN SOCIETY (1854). 
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recurrently popular,29 and a serious subject of inquiry by the first gen-
eration of professional economists who formed the American Economic 
Association.30 The Revenue Act of 1921 included some of the first gov-
ernment providing tax incentives to promote employee ownership of 
stocks and profit-sharing plans.31 On the whole, however, the main-
stream form of resistance to subordination in the workplace was 
through unionization and collective bargaining, reflecting in large part 
the acceptance that labor and capital were not just conceptual distinc-
tions but now sociologically distinct groups who should directly bargain 
over economic surpluses. 
In short, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 regularized col-
lective bargaining after decades of legal and police repression of unions, 
and its adversarial conception of labor/capital relations included an ex-
plicit ban on intra-corporate employee organizations, or what were 
known as “company unions.”32 The view that company unions were at-
tempts to undermine worker unions led to a general suspicion by union 
leaders of share ownership plans.33 Even attempts at promoting finan-
cial literacy became sites of ideological contest over co-optation in the 
U.S. labor movement,34 and more radical critiques from Marxist intel-
lectuals commonly rejected employee owned firms as reactionary and 
anti-revolutionary.35 
As entrenched as wage labor became in the U.S. economy, attempts 
to infuse capitalism with republican ideals persisted. Even as the Cold 
War deepened the association between American nationalism and free 
market capitalism, such hope did not fade. Louis Kelso, a corporate law-
yer and World War II veteran with an overtly patriotic set of motiva-
tions, developed his own interpretation of classical political economy in 
the 1940s, which he dubbed “binary economics.” Central to Kelso’s the-
ory was that human capital was far less important to modern capitalism 
than technological capital, and a mechanism was needed to equip all 
 
 29 See, e.g., JOHN CRAWFORD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF WEALTH (1886); Peter Grosscup, How to 
Save the Corporation, 24 MCCLURE’S MAG. 443 (1905). 
 30 Edward Bemis, Cooperation in the Northeast, 1 PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. ASS’N 7 (1886). 
 31 Margaret M. Blair et al., Employee Ownership: An Unstable Form or a Stabilizing Force, in 
THE NEW RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 241, 249 (Margaret M. 
Blair & Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000). 
 32 Daniel Nelson, Employee Representation in Historical Perspective, in EMPLOYEE 
REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 371 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. 
Kleiner eds., 1993). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Nicholas Osborne, Little Capitalists: The Social Economy of Saving in the United States, 
1816–1914 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the Colum-
bia University Library system). 
 35 ROSA LUXEMBURG, REFORM OR REVOLUTION (1970). 
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citizens with the ability to participate in the economy using both.36 
Kelso did not see himself as a critic of capitalism, but as its redeemer 
by integrating the majority of the population into capitalism’s produc-
tive power, the basis for his self-styled “Capitalist Manifesto.”37 Criti-
cally, he saw access to capital credit as a basic right of citizenship, in 
contrast to economic rights necessitating redistributive interventions 
by the government. 
Kelso would make his specific mark on American capitalism by de-
signing the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). Kelso designed 
the first ESOP in 1956 for a retiring newspaper owner in Palo Alto who 
wanted to sell his business to his employees. Under conventional fi-
nance, the employees would have had to negotiate a loan, collateralized 
by their personal savings and assets while drastically reducing their 
wages to pay off their collective debt. Kelso’s innovation was to set up 
the ESOP as a loan trust which collateralized the company itself and 
whose balance would be paid down by future corporate earnings—es-
sentially self-liquidating over time. Kelso firmly believed that capital 
ownership could be broadened through future growth in corporate earn-
ings, rather than by expropriating the assets of existing owners.38 The 
efficacy of this first ESOP was limited, as the newspaper employees still 
had to leverage their own assets for twenty-eight percent of the buyout 
loan, but the precedent was set. The ESOP held out the possibility of a 
private, and thus voluntary, mechanism for transitioning from concen-
trated to disperse capital ownership that solved the problem of a lack of 
initial capital buy-in by workers.39 
B. The ESOP as Regulatory Innovation 
Even with his great personal evangelism for the potential of ESOPs 
to transform and improve capitalism, Kelso found few initial other tak-
ers for his plan. The particular authority of an ESOP to borrow money 
to buy stock for participants was based solely on Internal Revenue Ser-
vice rulings and had no clear statutory authorization. The future suc-
cess of Kelso’s legal innovation was not born from the results of its early 
implementations, but from its political attractiveness. In 1973, Kelso 
persuaded Louisiana’s Democratic Senator Russell Long, then chair of 
Senate Finance Committee, to make promotion of the ESOP a national 
 
 36 Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 417, 443 
(2008). 
 37 See generally LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958). 
 38 JOHN LOGUE & JACQUELYN YATES, THE REAL WORLD OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 12 (2001). 
 39 Robert Hockett, What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other 
SOPs, and “Ownership Societies”, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 895 (2007). 
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legislative priority.40 Long was the son of famed radical Huey Long, but 
embraced a much more corporate-friendly form of right-wing populism 
than had his father. In his speeches about the ESOP, Long would extol 
notions of independence and self-reliance that drew on the still extant 
appeal of economic republicanism.41 
The rhetorical advantages of Kelso’s model became clear as left and 
right-wing politicians, ranging from Jesse Helms to Jesse Jackson, 
would take turns supporting a project that seemed simultaneously pro-
capitalism and pro-equality.42 The ESOP threatened no particular eco-
nomic interest, and had the appeal of gradualist caution while side-
stepping any need to address the sources of pre-existing capital inequal-
ities in American society. This advancement neither required national 
ownership of enterprise nor extensive government regulation, but could 
still generate greater civic equality through more widespread oppor-
tunity. 
At the center of its revolutionary narrative was the enlightened en-
trepreneur, already a success under the current system, as the virtuous 
redeemer of capitalism and whose private choice would not only help 
the U.S. better ward of the challenges of communism, but also Japanese 
economic power—a growing concern in the 1980s.43 Long could thus 
champion the ESOP as a truly American innovation, which represented 
a form of advanced capitalism involving high levels of employee owner-
ship and wide spread access to capital credit. Essentially, instead of try-
ing to create a revolution exogenous to capitalism, the ESOP sought to 
radicalize capitalism by increasing its own social exclusivity. 
Kelso convinced Long to formally include ESOP regulation as part 
of the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act44 in 
1974 (ERISA). ERISA gave statutory legitimacy to ESOPs and sanc-
tioned a robust set of tax incentives for their formation and payoff. 
ESOPs now qualified federally as an employee benefit plan regulated 
 
 40 RAYMOND RUSSELL, SHARING OWNERSHIP IN THE WORKPLACE 11 (1985); ALAN ZUNDEL, 
DECLARATIONS OF DEPENDENCY 109 (2000); see also Russell Long, Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans: Spreading the Wealth to the Average American Worker, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 515 (1977). 
 41 Andrew W. Stumpff, Fifty Years of Utopia: A Half-Century After Louis Kelso’s The Capitalist 
Manifesto, A Look Back at the Weird History of the ESOP, 62 TAX L. REV. 419, 424–25 (2008). 
 42 JEFF GATES, THE OWNERSHIP SOLUTION 167 (1998). 
 43 In this way the ESOP was a forerunner of the various Japanese workplace practices that 
would gain attention in the United States during the 1980s. The notion that Japanese corporate 
governance was potentially superior to U.S. models spurred the growth of more integrated theories 
of labor regulation and corporate governance. Donald Clarke, Nothing but Wind’? The Past and 
Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 83 (2011); Edward Rock, 
America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 
367 (1996). 
 44 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012). 
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by the U.S. Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service. 
Specifically, ESOPs were categorized as stock bonus plans under 
ERISA Code Section 401(a).45 Like other stock bonus plans, the ESOP 
trustee was to be picked by the company’s existing board of directors. 
Kelso’s original use of trust law was grafted onto a regulatory 
scheme originally intended for a quite distinct purpose: protecting re-
tirement investments. There was nothing inherent in ESOPs that man-
dated or even strongly suggested their operation as a retirement vehi-
cle; it was similar only as another form of capital accumulation. 
Moreover, the ESOP loan is repaid through employee payroll deduc-
tions and company earnings, but the true enabling component of ESOP 
regulation under ERISA is that ESOP trustees are granted an exemp-
tion from the core fiduciary duty that undergirded the whole of ERISA 
itself, the duty of diversification.46 For public companies, ESOP employ-
ees could vote their shares as would normal stock owners, but for pri-
vately held companies, as were and are the majority of ESOPs, the trus-
tee controlled the voting power of unallocated and allocated shares 
alike, except on issues of corporate sales or ownership realignments.47 
While Kelso saw this innovation as necessary for short-circuiting cur-
rent ownership patterns, it placed ESOPs in an odd position in regards 
to both their regulatory logic and the ideal of worker self-government. 
However, the politically unobjectionable positioning of the ESOP 
which Kelso and Long achieved initially found few detractors as Con-
gress continued to pass legislation after 1973 incentivizing ESOPs. 
First, incentives were created for the originators of the ESOP loans. Per 
IRS Code 133(a), a lender could exclude half of the income from an 
ESOP loan if the ESOP stock represented a majority ownership stake.48 
There were limitations in place to prevent self-dealing, as lenders were 
ineligible for this deduction if they were part of the same umbrella fi-
nancial organization as the company in question. IRS Section 4975(d)(3) 
also provided that a leveraged ESOP loan must be made for the benefit 
of employees, at a reasonable rate of interest, and can only use the com-
pany’s stock as security interest.49 Penalties were implemented so that 
if ownership levels fell below a certain, and in time changing, threshold 
of ownership. These incentives also extended to the repayment of the 
 
 45 Id. § 1101. 
 46 Id. § 1104(a)(2). 
 47 Michael Hart, ESOPs in Corporate Acquisitions, 14 BENEFITS L.J. 9, 12 (2001). 
 48 26 U.S.C. § 133(a) (repealed 1996). 
 49 Id. § 4975. 
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ESOP loan itself. The dividend contributions made by the company to 
pay off the ESOP loan were made tax deductible.50 
Cumulatively, these two incentives allowed ESOP loans to origi-
nate at comparatively low rates, and serve as an advantaged source of 
capital infusions for a corporation. In many ways, an ESOP is like an 
internal tax-exempt stock exchange. The ESOP generates a new source 
of low cost capital credit that can be repaid in pre-tax corporate dollars. 
The most consequential incentive for the proliferation of the ESOP 
was that previous owners could defer capital gains taxation on the sale 
proceeds, subject to a few requirements for the size of the ESOP and 
other self-dealing restrictions. Owners could thus rollover the full value 
of their existing interest in their corporation into other securities with-
out any tax consequences. This advantage is at the heart of Kelso’s plan 
to see existing corporate owners voluntarily facilitate his capital own-
ership revolution. 
In short order, Kelso’s original trust innovation and its regulation 
under ERISA helped fuel a relative explosion in ESOPs through the 
1980s. In the 1960s there were less than a dozen U.S. companies who 
operated with significant employee ownership, but by the late 1980s the 
number would rise to close to ten percent of the private workforce.51 
Today ESOPs total near a trillion dollar in assets.52 Most ESOPs are in 
small private companies, with fewer the fifty participants, with a third 
having majority ESOP ownership and a quarter with one hundred per-
cent ESOP ownership.53 
The popularity of the ESOP ideal led to a boom in interest regard-
ing employee ownership more generally. Pro-employee ownership com-
ponents were present in a range of new federal legislation, and several 
states passed their own parallel acts establishing centers for EO pro-
motion in general and ESOPs specifically.54 Private organizations fo-
cused on ESOP lobbying and research were a significant part of this 
 
 50 Under IRS Code 415(c)(1), the limit on these contributions was higher than for other defined 
contribution plans, with an inflation indexed ceiling of twenty-five percent of total worker pay. For 
employees, one quarter of their salary could also be deducted from gross income for principal pay-
ments on the ESOP loan, and more to pay interest expenses if the company was a C corporation. 
Any gains made on stock owned by the ESOP were not taxed until would be distributed, and gains 
qualified under IRS Code 1042(a) for further roll-over deferments. Gina Marie Agresta-Richard-
son, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Uncertainties Plaguing the Duties of the ESOP Fiduciary 
with Respect to Coting and Defensive ESOPs, 14 AKRON TAX J. 91, 96–98 (1999). 
 51 For general statistics on ESOP numbers over time, see ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan) Facts, NAT’L CTR. EMP. OWNERSHIP, https://www.esop.org/ [https://perma.cc/486Y-VLH8]. 
 52 THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, supra note 7. 
 53 A Statistical Profile of Employee Ownership, NAT’L CTR. EMP. OWNERSHIP (Nov. 2016), htt 
p://www.nceo.org/articles/statistical-profile-employee-ownership [https://perma.cc/ZLY5-B5KV]. 
 54 Timothy G. Merker, Working Toward Employee Ownership, 11 J. LEGIS. 127, 138–43 (1984). 
The most active and longest lasting state program is the Ohio Employee Ownership Center: Ohio 
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new wave of EO enthusiasm, including the ESOP Association, the 
Foundation for Enterprise Development and the National Center for 
Employee Ownership.55 Crucial to this growth were private consultants 
who came to specialize in ESOP valuation and formation as their main 
practice.56 
III. MISPLACED FOCI LEFT AND RIGHT: THE ACADEMIC DÉJÀ VU 
OF ESOPS 
A. The Reputational Divide of the ESOP 
Concurrent with the proliferation of ESOPs was a general increase 
in their academic investigation, along with employee ownership more 
broadly. The politically defensible position of ESOPs allowed them to be 
characterized as instantiations of radical but still patriotic economic re-
publicanism57 and studied by mainstream think tanks.58 Scholars ar-
gued for unions to embrace ESOPs and participate in their spread, put-
ting aside concerns they were ploys at weakening the larger labor 
movement.59 
The initial thrust of this academic interest was not to justify the 
ESOPs on political or rhetorical grounds, but to take up an evaluation 
of their impact on economic performance. While few who studied ESOPs 
fully embraced the particulars of Kelso’s theory of binary economics, 
most shared his belief that worker ownership improved the operational 
dynamics of corporations. The efficiency advantages of ESOP were ar-
gued to be sourced in improved worker productivity and informational 
dynamics within corporate governance.60 
The basic mechanism seen as increasing worker productivity in 
ESOPs was motivational in nature, as ownership linked increased prof-
 
Employee Ownership Center, http://www.oeockent.org [https://perma.cc/LYH8-VTN]. 
 55 Information on these groups can be found at their websites: The ESOP Association, http:// 
www.esopassociation.org [https://perma.cc/Z2UC-WN5Q]; Foundation for Enterprise Development. 
http://www.fed.org [https://perma.cc/SN6A-Z39H]; National Center for Employee Ownership, htt 
ps://www.nceo.org [https://perma.cc/ZL25-DMY5]. 
 56 The ESOP Association maintains a database of companies that provide ESOP-specific ser-
vices. ESOP Database, http://www.esopassociation.org/network/esop-experts (last visited Sept. 6, 
2017). 
 57 Simon, supra note 8. 
 58 See Margaret M. Blair & Douglas L. Kruse, Worker Capitalists? Giving Employees an Own-
ership Stake, 17 BROOKINGS REV. 23 (1999). 
 59 E.g., William Foote Whyte & Joseph R. Blasi, Employee Ownership and the Future of Un-
ions, 473 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 128, 137–40 (1984). 
 60 For a general discussion of Kelso and a summary of the general arguments for ESOPs, see 
JOSEPH BLASI ET AL., THE CITIZEN’S SHARE 159–163, ch. 5 (2013). 
12 KRONCKE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  11:26 AM 
300  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
itability to total worker compensation. Tying profitability to compensa-
tion relies on the elasticity of human effort and thus aligns corporate 
interest with employee interest. Early empirical results worked to dis-
pel the idea that ESOP contributions themselves were just wage sub-
stitutes, claiming that ESOP companies paid out higher average and 
median wages than comparable companies.61 Other studies showed that 
this ownership effect reduced various employee driven costs such as 
worker compensation claims.62 From the perspective of corporate gov-
ernance, employee owners were cast as internal agents able to minimize 
the informational and monitoring costs for both workers and managers. 
Improved workplace communication was cast as leading to higher re-
tention rate at ESOP companies, which in itself lowered long run hiring 
and training costs. 
Furthermore, the argument was advanced that when an ESOP 
company faces market downswings, employee owners are theoretically 
willing to accept a lower rate of return on capital than traditional in-
vestors. Without a demand for higher returns, the firm may be able to 
cut costs and remain competitive in its market for years to come.63 Re-
inforcing studies used this dynamic to explain the relative stability of 
ESOP companies, which rarely default on their original loans or go into 
bankruptcy, and can maintain their levels of employment during reces-
sions.64 While this stability may theoretically prevent the immediate 
transition of capital to higher-return allocations within the market, 
most of these analyses relied on a stated or implicit presumption that 
without long-term stakeholders, capital would chase short-term gains 
over long-term social returns. 
All of these discrete factors are cited in more general studies that 
have argued that ESOP companies are demonstrably more profitable 
than comparable companies,65 and that these benefits improve over 
 
 61 See, e.g., Douglas Kruse & Joseph Blasi, Employee Ownership, Employee Attitudes, and 
Firm Performance (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5277, 1995). 
 62 LOGUE & YATES, supra note 62, at 47. 
 63 Id. at 130. 
 64 A study by the Department of Labor in 1995 indicated that over a ten years period only 
0.8% of ESOP plans defaulted and less than 1% of ESOPs companies went into bankruptcy. Kruse 
& Blasi, supra note 61, at 19–20. In the last recession, ESOPs were four times less likely to cut 
employment. Cory Rosen, The Impact of Employee Ownership and ESOPs on Layoffs and the Costs 
of Unemployment to the Federal Government, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP (July 16, 2015), 
https://www.nceo.org/observations-employee-ownership/c/impact-employee-ownership-esops-layof 
fs-costs-unemployment-federal-government [https://perma.cc/H8GY-V5K2]. 
 65 SARAH MAVRINAC & NELL JONES, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., THE FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL 
RETURNS TO INNOVATIVE WORKPLACE PRACTICES: A CRITICAL REVIEW (1994); Saeyoung Chang, 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Investigation, 19 FIN. 
MGMT. 48 (1990). 
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time.66 The most active ESOP researchers have been Joseph Blasi and 
Douglas Kruse who regularly update their research showing two to 
three percent increases in ESOP profitability relative to their corporate 
cohort.67 Many of the new ESOP organizations founded in the 1980s 
sponsor this research,68 and it has also been promoted by the state agen-
cies created to evaluate the impact of ESOP incentives.69 A recent Ern-
est & Young study, for example, claims that S-ESOPs, in particular, 
outperformed the S&P 500 by sixty-two percent between 2002 and 
2015.70 
More challenging for ESOPs has been isolating which of the specific 
mechanisms theorized to contribute to ESOP successes are causally re-
lated to these numbers. Several dissertation-length case studies have 
attempted to establish this qualitatively, though the results are recur-
rently inconsistent.71 For ESOP proponents, this lack of causal clarity 
ever-lurks behind their more confident econometric conclusions. 
However, with equal vigor a steady and growing backlash against 
ESOPs emerged in parallel with studies advancing their positive attrib-
utes.72 Few of these studies directly attacked ESOPs by attempting to 
demonstrate the poor economic performance of companies with ESOPs. 
Instead, the primary thrust of these critiques stemmed from the unin-
tended uses of ESOPs and their mismatched regulation under ERISA. 
Critics argued that the significant tax incentives provided ESOPs 
led them to be enacted not as tools of worker empowerment, but as in-
struments for other corporate interests. Of highest profile were the ma-
nipulation of the tax-advantaged nature of ESOPs loans as a stop-gap 
 
 66 See, e.g., Raymond Lancaster, ESOP Accounts, Age and Seniority: Effect on Work Related 
Behavior at Four Small Companies (May 2004) (unpublished Executive Doctor of Management 
dissertation, Case Western University) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Library system). 
 67 SHARED CAPITALISM AT WORK (Douglas Kruse, Richard Freeman & Joseph Blasi eds., 2011). 
 68 Steven F. Freeman, Effects of ESOP Adoption and Employee Ownership: Thirty Years of 
Research and Experience (Univ. of Pa. Organizational Dynamics, Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007). 
 69 Peter Kardas et al., Wealth and Income Consequences of Employee Ownership: A Compara-
tive Study from Washington State, 10 J. EMP. OWNERSHIP L. & FIN. 3 (1998). 
 70 ERNST & YOUNG, CONTRIBUTIONS OF ESOPS TO PARTICIPANTS’ RETIREMENT SECURITY 
(2015). 
 71 Compare Fanmin Kong, The Effects of Profit Sharing Plans and ESOPs on Firm Employ-
ment Fluctuations (Aug. 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota) (on file with 
the University of Minnesota Library system) with Peter B. Thompson, Leader Values, the Struc-
ture of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, and Organizational Outcomes, (2003) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois) (on file with the University of Illinois Library system). 
 72 See, e.g., Ezra S. Field, Money for Nothing and Leverage for Free: The Politics and History 
of the Leveraged ESOP Tax Subsidy, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 740 (1997); Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. 
Wolfson, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Restructuring: Myths and Realities, 19 
FIN. MGMT. 12 (1990). 
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to recapitalize and stave off bankruptcies and other shutdown scenar-
ios.73 Others argued that ESOPs were in fact giveaways to existing own-
ers who see them simply as estate planning tools to avoid taxation,74 
which was an open tactic by private ESOP consultants.75 Another abu-
sive tactic highlighted by this scholarship is the use of ESOPs as anti-
takeover devices, where the formation of the ESOP instantly creates 
both risk-adverse owners in employees and an ESOP trustee appointed 
by current management.76 This tactic gained a great deal of attention 
during the attempted takeover of Polaroid in 1989.77 
Yet, the most heated critique of ESOPs has been the how they af-
fect workers’ economic diversification.78 These critiques argue that al-
lowing ESOPs to be regulated as retirement vehicles while exempted 
from ERISA’s general duty of diversification, especially without direct 
worker control, compromises workers’ long-term interests.79 Moreover, 
this risk is exponentially acute when corporate stock prices are falling.80 
The most famous instance where this risk was demonstrated was the 
decision in Summers v. State Street Bank when the employees of United 
Airlines sued their ESOP trustee for not selling off stock during 
United’s turn to bankruptcy in 2002. When Judge Richard Posner fi-
nally decided the case for the Seventh Circuit in 2006, he cited generally 
pro-employee ownership legal scholar Brett McDonnell, as well as 
Kruse and Blasi, but ultimately asserted that “[t]he time may have 
come to rethink the concept of an ESOP, a seemingly inefficient method 
 
 73 LOGUE & YATES, supra note 62, at 129. 
 74 Employee Stock Ownership Trusts: Tax Advantages for Estate Planning in Close Corpora-
tions, 84 YALE L.J. 1519 (1975). 
 75 Frank P. VanderPloeg & William C. Weinsheimer, Why Pay Estate Tax When an ESOP Will 
Do It for You, 10 PROBATE NOTES 132 (1984). The NCEO also promotes the advantages of contri-
butions to ESOPs as charitable donations. The Virtues of Using ESOPs with Charitable Contribu-
tions, NAT’L CTR. EMP. OWNERSHIP, https://www.nceo.org/articles/esops-charitable-contributions 
[https://perma.cc/2NGL-QYR8]. 
 76 Peter J. Walsh, Jr., The ESOP as an Anti-Takeover Defense, 8 DEL. LAW. 39 (1990); Eric A. 
Grannis, Problem of Mixed Motives: Applying Unocal to Defensive ESOPs, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 851 
(1992). 
 77 See Robert F. Bruner & E. Richard Brownlee II, Leveraged ESOPs, Wealth Transfers, and 
“Shareholder Neutrality:” The Case of Polaroid, 19 FIN. MGMT. 59 (1990). 
 78 E.g., Michael D. Savage, The Attack on Proposed ESOP Regulations: A Battle Won at the 
Expense of the War?, 63 A.B.A. J. 716 (1977); William R. Levin, The False Promise of Worker Cap-
italism: Congress and the Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 148 (1985); 
Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing ESOPs, 45 TAX L. REV. 363 (1990). 
 79 Meredith L. Gray, Comment, A Presumption Without Prudence: Replacing Moench v. Rob-
ertson with a Prudent “When in Doubt, Don’t” Standard for ESOP and 401(k) Company Stock Fund 
Fiduciaries, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 907. 
 80 Kenneth Hayes, Moench v. Robertson: When Must an ESOP Fiduciary Abandon a Sinking 
Ship?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1231 (1997). 
12 KRONCKE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  11:26 AM 
287] ESOPS AND FRACTIONALIZED OWNERSHIP 303 
 
of wealth accumulation by employees because of the under-diversifica-
tion to which it conduces.”81 
This under-diversification argument continued to gain steam dur-
ing the general turn against employer stock in 401(k)s,82 which empha-
sized the irrationalities stemming from exaggerated optimism, worker 
lock-in and the same endowment effects found in home ownership. 
These liabilities were notably on display during the collapse of Enron 
in 2001.83 Following the financial crisis beginning in 2007, more stories 
emerged of ESOP trust valuations going to zero.84 Three years after be-
ing named the ESOP Association’s Public Company of the Year, Procter 
& Gamble witnessed a ninety-two percent decrease in the value of its 
employee’s retirement benefits.85 
As a result of these critiques and the recurrence of financial crises, 
much of the ESOP enabling federal and state legislation of the 1980s 
has lapsed, including specific interventions to limit abusive uses to re-
duce tax expenditures.86 The most significant change was the elimina-
tion of the roll-over provision for original corporate owners found in the 
1989 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, essentially eliminating the 
use of ESOPs as a privileged method for avoiding estate taxation.87 Af-
ter the removal of this provision, the number of ESOPs in the U.S. has 
remained relatively steady. And while ESOP trustees have avoided los-
ing their ERISA exemption, ESOPs continue to face increased regula-
tion as part of the general limits on retirement investments following 
the Pension Protection Act of 2006. 
This back and forth of legislative support was repeated in micro-
cosm when in 1998 Congress allowed S Corporations to form ESOPs, 
along with a tax emption for corporate earnings proportional to the 
ESOPs ownership of corporate stock.88 Spurred by the existing pattern 
 
 81 Summers v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 1249 (2007). 
 82 Dana M. Muir, The U.S. Culture of Employee Ownership and 401(K) Plans, 14 ELDER L.J. 
1, 18 (2006). 
 83 David Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 113 
(2002). 
 84 Sean M. Anderson, Risky Retirement Business: How ESOPs Harm the Workers They Are 
Supposed to Help, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2009). 
 85 P&G’s ESOP Lauded, CIN. BUS. COURIER (May 16, 1997), http://www.bizjournals.com/cin 
cinnati/stories/1997/05/12/daily22.html [https://perma.cc/BPZ4-5HEU]. 
 86 John Logue, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Subnational Strategies to Promote Em-
ployee Ownership, Owners at Work 4 (2001) (presented at Capital Ownership Group Conference, 
Washington, D.C.). 
 87 See TODD SYNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21526, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS 
(ESOPS): LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (May 20, 2003). 
 88 Michael S. Knoll, Samuel Zell, the Chicago Tribune, and the Emergence of the S ESOP: 
Understanding the Tax Advantages and Disadvantages of S ESOPs, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 520–21 
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of concentrated S corporation ownership, S-ESOPs proliferated and the 
trade association ESCA, Employee-Owned S Corporations of America, 
quickly formed and came to claim 190,000 members. In 2005, Congress 
modified these regulations to limit the ability of small, closely held busi-
nesses to form S-ESOPs—again bringing an end to their expansion.89 
B. The Limitations of Regulatory Re-invention 
The debate over ESOPs over the last forty years has reached a 
steady tempo where these positive and critical positions are periodically 
recycled in new surveys and articles. Starting in the late 1970s, propo-
nents have addressed critiques and re-stated the need for Congressional 
action to foster employee ownership.90 They cite surveys that very few 
ESOPs were created under conditions of near-bankruptcy or duress.91 
They also point out that criticisms of ESOP formation as a takeover 
defense forget that high priced takeover offerings can be a great boon 
to employee owners just as they would be to any other type of owner 
and that workers’ longer time horizons better equip them to resist-
short-term value grabs by self-interested managers.92 Proponents have 
also exerted a great deal of effort to demonstrate that few ESOP partic-
ipants are under-diversified in comparison to industry norms, and that 
most ESOP companies provide a secondary retirement plan for work-
ers.93 Some have argued that what diversification issues remains can 
be solved through insurance for long-term market downswings.94 Most 
ESOP proponents lament the stultifying effect of removing the ESOP 
rollover benefit for owners, and often cite Logue and Yates’s longitudi-
nal study of ESOPs in Ohio to claim that most ESOPs are formed not 
 
(2009). 
 89 Beckett Cantley, Congress Giveth and Congress Taketh Away: The Slow Death of the 
SESOP, 20 AKRON TAX J. 59, 72–74 (2005). 
 90 See, e.g., Timothy Tomlinson, Securities Regulation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A 
Comparison of SEC Policy and Congressional Intent, 31 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1978). 
 91 Less than two percent of ESOP were established under these conditions. THE ESOP 
ASSOCIATION, supra note 7. 
 92 NICHOLAS V. GIANARIS, MODERN CAPITALISM: PRIVATIZATION, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, AND 
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 127 (1996). 
 93 THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, supra note 7. On average ESOP companies contribute seventy-
five percent more to their workers total retirement plans than comparable companies. Loren Rog-
ers, ESOPs as Retirement Benefits: An Analysis of DOL Data, THE MENKE GROUP (Fall 2010), 
http://www.menke.com/blog/esops-as-retirement-benefits-an-analysis-of-dol-data/ [https://perma. 
cc/458W-WKE3]; see also Research on Employee Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Employee 
Compensation, https://www.nceo.org/articles/research-employee-ownership-corporate-performan 
ce [https://perma.cc/JLX4-Y8X4]. 
 94 Lauren E. Berson & Nicholas L. Cushing, Safeguarding Employee Stock Ownership Plans: 
Insurance as Assurance, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 539 (2008). 
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to draw in new capital or to improve departing owners’ tax interests 
alone.95 
Several times ESOP proponents have made arguments for the re-
form of ESOPs to address various criticisms.96 California Republican 
House Member Dana Rohrabacher has been the most consistent propo-
nent of ESOPs, and is considered one of the most politically conserva-
tive members of Congress. In 1999, Rohrabacher co-sponsored legisla-
tion with self-identified socialist Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders that 
would have established a new federal corporation type, the Employee 
Owned and Controlled Corporation—ninety percent employee owned 
and eligible for even more significant tax breaks.97 Rohrabacher was 
also instrumental in getting ESOP-favorable proposals included in the 
2004 American Job Creation Act,98 and Sanders has continued to intro-
duce legislation promoting ESOPs up through his recent run for the 
U.S. Presidency.99 
Yet, this cycle of critique and promotion leaves sidelined the fun-
damental issue which challenges the role of ESOPs as an effective sys-
temic tool for spreading employee ownership as a genuine form of eco-
nomic republicanism.100 The theory that ownership of company shares 
empowers workers requires, in an era of growing director primacy, a 
strong assumption of intra-corporate shareholder democracy and that 
such participation is a meaningful restriction on labor subordination by 
management or other owners.101 The relative success of the ESOP as an 
ad hoc regulatory innovation required it to significantly compromise 
both of these objectives by making direct voting rights of ESOP trust 
shares optional and allowing existing managers to appoint ESOP trus-
tees. Critically, the initiation of ESOPs does not itself require employee 
consent.102 
 
 95 Logue and Yate’s study of Ohio’s 270 then active ESOPs set the split at 70/30 for philosoph-
ical motivations for implementing an ESOP. LOGUE & YATES, supra note 62, at 129. 
 96 Kieron Swaine, Public Policy and Employee Ownership: Designing Economic Institutions 
for a Good Society, 26 POL’Y SCI. 289, 309–310 (1993). 
 97 LOGUE & YATES, supra note 62, at 171. 
 98 Member Proposals for Improvements to the U.S. Tax System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Tax Policy of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 114th Cong. 44 (2016). 
 99 Senator Sanders Introduces Bill to Support Employee Ownership, VT. EMP. OWNERSHIP 
CTR., http://www.veoc.org/node/68 [https://perma.cc/5SJN-GS6K]. 
 100 Brett McDonnell, ESOPS’ Failures: Fiduciary Duties When Managers of Employee-Owned 
Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 199, 260 (2000). 
 101 See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn to-
ward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071 (2010). 
 102 Michael E. Murphy, The ESOP at Thirty: A Democratic Perspective, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
655, 663–64 (2005). 
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In addition, there is still no formal bar to a corporation taking out 
a large ESOP loan, making large pre-tax repayments, and then cancel-
ing the program. While few active ESOPs take this form, ninety percent 
of all tax benefits for ESOPs, and thus decreases in government reve-
nue, are attributable to ESOP plans that have paid off very little of their 
loan debt as well as represent low levels of overall employee owner-
ship.103 The fact that “employee” for ESOP purposes can include all lev-
els of management leads to the same cynicism that ESOPs loans are 
simply management self-lending, where ESOP participation is limited 
to select employees who can manipulate stock prices.104 And the rise 
and fall of the S-ESOP rested on almost completely on a formal, but 
empty, re-categorization of existing owners as workers. 
In practice, this disconnect between ownership and actual con-
trol/participation in workplace governance strikes at the very heart of 
the republican linkage of private and public virtue. Even for majority 
owned ESOP corporations, only a small majority pass on voting rights 
to individual employees, and even fewer in minority-owned firms.105 
While ESOP voting rights are not necessarily withheld from workers, 
all aspects of ESOPs are still determined by managerial discretion. For 
example, one of the most heralded early ESOPs was that of Science Ap-
plications International Corporation (SAIC). Founder Richard Beyster 
funded a great deal of ESOP promotion and scholarship, but subsequent 
reporting revealed that Beyster used managerial power over the ESOP 
to enforce a highly authoritarian governance culture at SAIC.106 More-
over, managers quickly took the company public after Beyster’s forced 
retirement. 
These anti-participatory dynamics have helped reinforce existing 
union mistrust of ESOPs as variations of company unionism. Tellingly, 
only a small fraction of ESOPs exist at union-friendly workplaces.107 
Studies of labor disputes post-ESOP formation have shown no decline 
in their frequency, if a general shift to holdouts rather than strikes.108 
 
 103 LOGUE & YATES, supra note 62, at 170. 
 104 GIANARIS, supra note 92, at xvii. 
 105 LOGUE & YATES, supra note 62, at 32. 
 106 Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Washington’s $8 Billion Shadow, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 
2007), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2007/03/spyagency200703 [https://perma.cc/T2N4-EEQ2]. 
 107 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and Implementation of 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other “Survivalists”, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 964–65 (1998); Dan Bell, Worker-Owners and Unions: Why Can’t We Just 
Get Along?, DOLLARS & SENSE (Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2006/09 
06bell.html [https://perma.cc/N9MC-Z58M]. 
 108 Peter Cramton et al., ESOP Fables: The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on 
Labor Disputes (Federal Reserve of New York Working Paper No. 347, 2007). 
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And to the extent that unions can effectively bargain over ESOP contri-
butions,109 such bargaining would then truly render them simply risky 
wage substitutes. 
Here again the costs of ESOPs regulation under ERISA rears its 
ugly head. While some proponents have argued for requiring majority 
voting for trustee appointments, or even trustee decisions,110 such re-
form, especially as it implicates unallocated ESOP shares, would again 
conflict with the fiduciary model required by ERISA.111 This continued 
disconnect between ESOP formation and worker empowerment re-
frames the diversification critique not simply in terms of general fidu-
ciary principles but also in how employees bear the brunt of the risks 
and costs of ESOP formation and maintenance. 
The well-documented failure of Weirton Steel’s ESOP—which was 
the then largest ESOP in the U.S. when formed in 1984—replayed all 
the possible downsides of ESOP’s current governance structure.112 The 
employees collectively agreed to significant wage cuts to pay McKinsey 
& Co. $500,000 to study the possibility of ESOP formation, and then 
even more to implement it. While initially buoyed by an immediate up-
tick in international steel markets, Weirton faced repeated conflicts be-
tween workers and management in which the ESOP trustee steadfastly 
backed management decisions. Though outside expertise had been used 
to set up the ESOP, it was left to the workers themselves to try and 
discern how to navigate life as ESOP employees amid even greater man-
agerial entrenchment post-ESOP formation.113 And the experience of 
Weirton Steel has been replicated in other firms, often representing, 
like United Airlines, the largest ESOP projects.114 
In fact, the prominent role of private ESOP consultants and entre-
preneurs as funders of ESOP research and lobbyists for continued fed-
eral and state subsidization is necessarily predicated on their own self-
interest. While some ESOP consultants may be true believers in em-
ployee ownership, their existence as repeat players in the market for 
 
 109 James D. Hutchinson, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A New Tool in the Collective Bar-
gaining Inventory, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 536 (1977). 
 110 Olson called this a “co-operative ESOP.” Deborah Groban Olson, Union Experiences with 
Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issues Raised by ESOPs, TRASOPS, Stock Purchases, and 
Co-operatives, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 729, 818–22 (1982). 
 111 Matthew M. O’Toole, The Disproportionate Effects of an ESOP’s Proportional Voting, 85 
NW. U. L. REV. 824 (1991). 
 112 See generally CHARLES S. VARANO, FORCED CHOICES: CLASS, COMMUNITY, AND WORKER 
OWNERSHIP (1999); C. JOHN KRUZESKI, WESAP: WEIRTON STEEL EMPLOYEE STOCK ANNIHILATION 
PLAN (2005). 
 113 McDonnell, supra note 100. 
 114 John D. Russell et al., Stained Steel: ESOPs, Meta-Power, and the Ironies of Corporate De-
mocracy, 27 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 383 (2004). 
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ESOP valuation and formation creates conflicts of interest for a process 
that is still almost universally management instigated.115 In 2001, John 
Logue approximated that private sector ESOP practitioners outnum-
bered public and non-profit workers by a 50:1 ratio.116 The U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice has been increasingly aggressive in investigating and 
prosecuting management manipulations in ESOP formations, following 
the larger trend of monitoring how workers’ capital can often be used 
against their collective self-interests.117 
On a broader scale, even with the significant tax subsidies they 
have enjoyed, the impact of ESOPs as a social policy has been limited. 
In Robert Hockett’s 2007 study of stock ownership plans he noted that 
“how few Americans hold substantial, material-independence-confer-
ring or participation-fostering stakes in firms” which would validate the 
ideal of an ownership society.118 The reality of ESOPs as a regulatory 
re-invention may have simply created a gap in the closed system of cor-
porate finance that Kruse and Blasi’s claim “recycles credit until wealth 
grows bigger and bigger and rewards existing owners.”119 
Simply put, ESOPs cannot impact patterns of capital accumulation 
outside of stock ownership. One has to remember that only ten percent 
of all economic wealth, even in a developed country such as the United 
States, is held in stocks.120 While it has been demonstrated that ESOPs 
are rarely pure wage substitutes, the efficiency and income gains re-
ported by pro-ESOP studies are still far from revolutionary, as long-
time ESOP supporter Corey Rosen admits: “[i]f all ESOPs are expected 
to do is make employees more money, the case for them could become 
very hard to make.”121 
Beyond the general structural limits of ESOPs to achieve their loft-
iest ideological goals, there is also a hereto unexamined possibility that 
ESOPs are in fact inequality exacerbating rather than inequality re-
ducing. The inability for the rare focused case study to establish exactly 
how ESOPs enhance workplace dynamics reflects the reality that the 
vast majority of ESOP studies likely suffer from quite significant en-
dogeneity issues. This goes far beyond controlling for the impact of tax 
subsidies themselves, to the fact that most ESOP plans, especially if 
 
 115 Sean M. Anderson, supra note 84, at 18. 
 116 Logue, supra, note 86, at 4. 
 117 David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106, 2152 
(2014). 
 118 Hockett, supra note 39. 
 119 Hansmann, supra note 4, at 1779. 
 120 COREY ROSEN, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: PERFORMANCE, PROSPECTS AND PROMISE, in 
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 24 (Cory Rosen & Karen Young eds., 1991). 
 121 Id. at 41. 
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enacted for ideological reasons, exist at companies that are already 
likely to have progressive workplace policies and atypical compensation 
patterns.122 
Thus, it may be true that most ESOPs exist in companies where 
employees have more robust and diversified retirement options than 
companies of comparable market positions.123 But that does not mean 
that these employees would lose these comparatively generous benefits 
without an ESOP, beyond what one would expect for their level of tax 
subsidization. Similarly, the low termination rate of existing ESOPs in 
part reflects that fact that many ESOPs are initiated not when compa-
nies are distressed but when they have already achieved a track record 
of success. The previously cited performance gaps between S-ESOPs 
and other S Corporations are so pronounced they cannot be explained 
simply by enhanced productivity or by their survivability during the re-
cent recession.124 ESOPs succeed not because they impel average or low-
performing companies to succeed, but are at best expressions of compa-
nies that are already doing well or are already committed to participa-
tory workplace practices. 
This type of endogeneity concern exists throughout most of the pro-
ESOP scholarship. One of the earliest broad surveys of ESOPs by the 
General Accounting Office in 1987 claimed the ESOPs were not them-
selves meaningful without a “supportive” corporate culture,125 and the 
acquisition of majority ownership status could not be linked to new or 
increased growth as ESOPs age.126 Subsequent studies have reiterated 
that ownership alone cannot improve worker motivation without a con-
tinued commitment to participatory programming.127 In contrast, vari-
ations in worker participation, distinct from ownership, ultimately ex-
plain a great deal of whatever comparative profitability companies with 
ESOPs enjoy.128 Thus, the presence of ESOPs at successful companies 
 
 122 Joseph Blasi et al., Do Broad-based Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing and Stock Options 
Help the Best Firms Do Even Better?, 54 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 55 (2016). 
 123 See Joseph Blasi et al., Risk and Lack of Diversification under Employee Ownership (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14229, 2008). 
 124 See Phillip Swagel & Robert Carroll, Resilience and Retirement Security: Performance of S-
ESOP Firms in the Recession, THE MENKE GROUP (March 10, 2010), http://www.menke.com/ar 
chives_articles/resilience-retirement-security.pdf?x34404 [https://perma.cc/4U5M-NP9B]. 
 125 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEMD-87-8, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ESOP TAX INCENTIVES FOR BROADENING STOCK OWNERSHIP (1986). 
 126 Andrew J. Torgove, Employee Ownership, Competitive Share Markets, Control Premia and 
the Performance of the Firm (May 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The New School) (on file 
with the New School Library system). 
 127 See Douglas Kruse et al., Motivating Employee-Owners in ESOP Firms, in EMPLOYEE 
PARTICIPATION, FIRM PERFORMANCE AND SURVIVAL (Virginié Perotin & Andrew Robinson eds., 
2004). 
 128 LOGUE & YATES, supra note 62, at 101. 
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seems more driven by these pre-existing commitments than the exist-
ence of ESOPs themselves. What this ultimately means is that ESOP 
tax subsidies are only serving to further benefit those who are already 
at the top of the labor market, and less likely to suffer the worst effects 
of workplace subordination. The end result of which can only be ine-
quality exacerbating. 
What then of companies without such commitments, and without 
stable pre-existing market success? Perhaps the most damning demon-
stration of the pitfalls of the ESOP is the rare ethnographic study made 
by Carole Bruce.129 Bruce carried out a longitudinal study of an ESOP 
that would at the outset have appeared to follow the Kelsonian ideal. 
An agricultural and horticultural company, Arboretum had an existing 
owner who chose to sell the company to its workers through an ESOP 
(to reinvest in other ventures). Arboretum’s ESOP even included the 
less common right of workers to partial board representation. However, 
Bruce reveals how little impact workers had on Arboretum’s govern-
ance, and how formal ownership did little to disrupt the broad range of 
direct and indirect status differentiations among employees and man-
agers. Workers were most disappointed by the simple fact that they 
were not able to access the scheduling flexibility they had originally 
expected.130 Though ESOP consultants had been brought in during the 
company’s initial conversion, little to no post-transition training was 
provided for existing or new hires.131 
While Arboretum had been successful in the past, it had run tight 
profit margins now undermined by new debt obligations and the need 
to payoff future retirements. By contrast, the former owner of Arbore-
tum not only stayed on as the well-compensated chairman of the board, 
but also continued to demand obedience to his vision for the company 
and routinely excluded employee representatives from key strategic 
meetings. This example adds an even more cynical edge to the generally 
low level of participation in ESOP governance by rank and files employ-
ees.132 
In practice, the transition to the ESOP at Arboretum generated 
even greater feelings of insecurity and subordination for employees.133 
The size of the ESOP loan hung over the workers’ heads, and repayment 
 
 129 Carole F. Bruce, Building Workplace Democracy in America: Employee-Owned Industry 
Models (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fielding Graduate Institute) (on file with the 
Fielding Graduate Institute Library system). 
 130 Id. at 146–53. 
 131 Id. at 171–82. 
 132 Corey Rosen, Employee Ownership: Performance, Prospects and Promise, in 
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 1, 27 (Cory Rosen & Karen Young eds., 1991). 
 133 Bruce, supra note 129, at 198. 
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obligations, however comparatively subsidized, reduced investment in 
the company and contributed to an ever-present sense of economic pre-
carity.134 In this case, the company had provided no previous retirement 
benefits, and the ESOP became the workers’ only retirement vehicle. 
Even with some formal participatory powers, employees felt that man-
agers came to wield even greater power over them as their sense of re-
sponsibility for corporate performance—without real participation in 
decision-making—was deployed vigorously as a new disciplinary tool. 
While not necessarily a precarious workplace pre-ESOP, this case 
study constellates the endogeneity issues faced in evaluating ESOPs as 
worthy objects of public subsidy.135 Here we see the flipside of ESOPs 
political attractiveness as an intrasystemic reform—its apoliticism ap-
peals to those who are already winners within the current system and 
who are naturally drawn to voluntary private mechanisms that do not 
challenge the terms of their pre-existing success. For already successful 
companies, the impact of the ESOP can be benign, but even here ESOPs 
are counter-productive in the search for pre-tax structures that ease 
economic inequality,136 much less realize the transformative ideals of 
economic republicanism. 
C. The ESOP Conundrum as the EO Conundrum 
The limitations of the ESOP as an innovation to promote economic 
republicanism, if not simply material equality, is centrally derived from 
its characteristics that at first blush appear to be so alluring. It would 
seem to cut through otherwise entrenched political divisions while of-
fering up the possibility of recapturing a lost human element in eco-
nomic production without broad regulatory upheaval, much less social 
revolution. Louis Kelso’s legal ingenuity in crafting the ESOP reflected 
his own general commitment to capitalism and voluntary reform. But 
this ingenuity came at a cost, as it generated a legal form that ulti-
mately led to more problems and abuses than it transformed any par-
ticular workplace or assuaged growing inequality. 
By opting for a gradualist reform strategy that completely divorced 
worker participation from ownership, Kelso’s ESOP came to acutely ev-
idence what will be called the “employee ownership conundrum.” Pro-
ponents of employee ownership, in and outside of the specific ESOP con-
text, have recurrently wrestled with the tensions between gradualist 
and systemic change as well as linking ownership to genuine workplace 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 Stanley R. Pietruska III, ESOPs: Corporate Advantages Put Taxpayers at a Disadvantage 
23 W. ST. U. L. REV. 53 (1995). 
 136 Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 45 STETSON L. R. 69 (2015). 
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participation. Yet, the ideological appeal of employee ownership finds 
adherents on almost every continent, as there have even been attempts 
to spread ESOPs across the globe.137 The EO conundrum thus function-
ally expresses itself in questions over why employee ownership has not 
become more prominent in modern economies, and how/if its episodic 
successes can be better generalized. 
Moving from debates over ESOPs to employee ownership more gen-
erally is often a muddy process. EO scholarship, especially in the U.S. 
where ESOPs consume much of its attention, often works with a great 
deal of definitional slippage when discussing employee ownership. 
Sometimes “employee ownership” is cited as the general inquiry when 
it is in fact purely ESOPs that are at question. Other studies will in-
clude non-ESOP stock purchase plans, and some will include full 
worker cooperatives. It is a persistent enough issue that general cau-
tions are still made within the scholarship to clearly delineate even 
basic issues such as minority and majority share ownership in different 
forms of EO.138 
Some analytical overlap between ESOP and EO scholarship is nat-
ural, and it is possible to find in critiques of employee ownership the 
same diversification and risk-aversion arguments leveled against 
ESOPs.139 Even without facing tax-subsidy or abusive use critiques, the 
general EO scholarship tends to elide direct confrontation with issues 
of inequality and workplace subordination. Instead it focuses on the 
general Pareto efficiency of employee ownership as a governance ideal, 
with proponents again asserting its performative benefits and critics 
taking its lack of existing prominence as the natural result of a market-
driven revealed preferences. 
Perhaps the oddest thing about the structure of the general EO de-
bate is its persistently strong preference for solely quantitative evalua-
tion amid intense disagreement over causal mechanisms. The result of 
this imbalance is a constant statistical battle that has difficulty reach-
ing persuasive claims about the underlying workplace mechanisms of 
either EO success or failure. This state of affairs is driven in part by the 
dominance of economists in EO debates, but it is still striking as the 
empirical baseline of EO studies has remained clear for some time now. 
Companies with varying levels of EO have rarely been demonstrated to 
 
 137 Jedidiah Kroncke, Comparative Employee Ownership: The Regulatory Ecologies of Eco-
nomic Republicanism (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author). 
 138 See, e.g., Eric Kaarsemaker et al., Employee Share Ownership Plans: A Review, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZATIONS (Paul J. Gollan et al. eds., 2010). 
 139 See, e.g., Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Credit Market Imperfections and the Incidence 
of Worker-Owned Firms, 45 METROECONOMICA 209 (1994). 
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perform less well than those without it.140 Some studies may find neu-
tral or statistically insignificant differences, but it is rare to find ro-
bustly negative results. Critics never point to specific company case 
studies where newly high EO levels led to performative degeneration or 
collapse. Instead, critics simply restate that EO promotion is unneces-
sary, assuming whatever levels exist are a “natural” equilibrium.141 
This is not an impasse that quantitative studies can overcome, as pro-
ponents can only make generalized arguments of EO superiority to 
which critics’ survivalist position can easily accommodate simply 
through a call for inaction. 
If we return to the endogeneity issues discussed in relationship to 
ESOP companies, this static state of argumentation is well-represented 
in the difficulty that pro-ESOP and pro-EO scholars, in the United 
States and abroad, have had in differentiating the effects of share own-
ership from the impacts of non-ownership but pro-worker participation 
policies.142 A company can create any number of programs that em-
power workers’ in any range of governance issues without their basis 
being in an ownership right. ESOPs are particularly vulnerable to this 
analytic bind as actual ownership-based participation is routinely lim-
ited. 
In Judge Posner’s aforementioned ruling in State Street Bank, he 
cited the research of Blasi and Kruse exactly to this effect.143 He was 
not unconvinced of the merit of ESOPs simply by their misfit under 
ERISA, but by the lack of persuasive evidence that ESOP formation led 
to the benefits that justified its preferential tax treatment.144 Blasi and 
Kruse responded to Posner’s citation by claiming that their empirical 
work had advanced since the specific study Posner cited, and that they 
could argue more confidently that “the interaction of employee owner-
ship and other forms of shared capitalism with other corporate policies 
is associated with positive workplace performance.”145 But an argument 
 
 140 James C. Sesil, Sharing Ownership via Employee Stock Ownership, in OWNERSHIP AND 
GOVERNANCE OF ENTERPRISES 96 (Laixiang Sun ed., 2003). 
 141 See, e.g., Berson & Cushing, supra note 94. 
 142 OXERA CONSULTING, TAX-ADVANTAGED EMPLOYEE SHARE SCHEMES: ANALYSIS OF 
PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS (2007), https://www.oxera.com/getmedia/6cd32d14-e6d5-44cb-b84b-55225 
82e38c9/Tax-advantaged-employee-share-schemes%E2%80%94overview.pdf.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/UE2Y-UB8C]; Ernest H. O’Boyle et al., Employee Ownership and Firm Performance: A Meta-
Analysis, 26 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. J. 425 (2016). 
 143 Summers v. State Street Bank Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Joseph Blasi & Douglas Kruse, The Court’s Views on Employee Ownership Research, OHIO 
EMP. OWNERSHIP CTR. http://www.oeockent.org/download/judge_posner’s_decision_and_responses 
_/oaw-posnerrespblasikruse.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJX7-6S43]; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The 
United Airline Bankruptcy and the Future of Employee Ownership, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & 
EMPLOYMENT POL. J. 227 (2003). 
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for interactivity is still causally murky and only recapitulates the en-
dogeneity problem—once again compounded by definitional slippage in 
distinguishing forms and levels of employee ownership. 
The EO scholarship outside of ESOPs and outside of the U.S. sim-
ilarly has difficulty finding a specific causal role for EO beyond the 
measurable impact of pro-participatory programs.146 A recent survey of 
European companies shows that companies with EO do better by cohort 
comparison, but this can only be traced to the presence of an EO pro-
gram and no effect could be found between levels of EO, or improving 
following increasing levels of EO within the same company over time.147 
Another recent, more global survey by Blasi and Kruse, joined by their 
frequent co-author Richard Freeman, again points to the presence of 
EO policies at worker-friendly companies, but cannot specifically isolate 
the independent effect of share ownership.148 While such complemen-
tary effects may still be proven at a later date, the fact remains that 
actual corporate decision making at most EO firms is indistinguishable 
from non-EO companies,149 and that most of the firms analyzed were 
not low performers to begin with. The endogeneity issue is reinforced 
even further by studies that show that EO programs are found in com-
panies within highly competitive labor markets in which employees are 
already comparatively empowered to bargain for varied forms of com-
pensation.150 
The same pattern repeats itself when general productivity claims 
are specified into arenas such as corporate innovation and human cap-
ital development.151 Furthermore, studies have shown countervailing 
results on discrete workplace practices where ESOPs exhibit patterns 
 
 146 JONATHAN MICHIE ET AL., EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, MOTIVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY (2002), 
http://www.efesonline.org/LIBRARY/Employees%20Dirct%20Report.qxd.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB 
B2-65F5]. 
 147 See Ansgar Richter & Susanne Schrader, Levels of Employee Share Ownership and the Per-
formance of Listed Companies in Europe, 54 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 1 (2016). 
 148 Joseph Blasi et al., Do Broad-based Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing and Stock Options 
Help the Best Firms Do Even Better?, 54 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 55 (2016). 
 149 James Sesil et al., Sharing Ownership via Employee Stock Ownership, in OWNERSHIP AND 
GOVERNANCE OF ENTERPRISES 96, 115 (Laixiang Sun ed., 2003). 
 150 E. HAN KIM & PAIGE OUIMET, EMPLOYEE CAPITALISM OR CORPORATE SOCIALISM? BROAD-
BASED EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP (2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1529631 [https://perma.cc/5MC8-WD2W]. 
 151 Erika E. Harden et al., Who Has a Better Idea? Innovation, Shared Capitalism and Human 
Resources Policies, in SHARED CAPITALISM AT WORK 225, 248–50 (Douglas L. Kruse et al. eds., 
2010); Andrew Pendleton & Andrew Robinson, Employee Share Ownership and Human Capital 
Development: Complementarity in Theory and Practice, 32 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 439 (2011). 
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of managerial entrenchment.152 This type of complementary relation-
ship also has been advanced for the presence of unions,153 but again it 
is hard to distinguish this effect from unions’ separate impact on any 
pro-employee policy, such as profit sharing.154 
This often empirically orthogonal relationship between ownership 
and participation is what leaves pro-EO positions so vulnerable to sur-
vivalist arguments that recur to their own theories of the more general 
question of employee motivation and compensation.155 Survivalist cri-
tiques do not need to directly undermine arguments about the perfor-
mance of companies with EO, or develop general governance models 
that wholly contradict theoretical linkages between EO and discrete 
employee behaviors. For example, studies have shown that EO compa-
nies generally suffer from less employee theft156 and reduced absentee-
ism.157 One can admit this as true without then jumping to a wholesale 
endorsement of EO, especially if the size effects are small. 
The classic survivalist retort to ESOPs is the “1/N” problem com-
monly discussed in debates over the impact of employee stock in 401(k) 
accounts of large companies. Here the greater the number of employees, 
the lower the individual incentive for an employee to engage in self-
sacrificing behavior.158 This general model better explains studies that 
show no independent productivity effects for stock option plans,159 and 
is further buttressed by the whole of the academic literature on execu-
tive compensation—whose most consistent empirical result is that the 
granting of stock options to high level managers, the exact actors most 
directly involved in corporate decision-making and not subject to the 
 
 152 John Gamble, Management Commitment of Innovation and ESOP Stock Concentration, 15 
J. OF BUS. VENTURING 433 (2000). 
 153 Richard C. Hoffman et al., MBC Ventures, Inc.: An ESOP with a Union Partner, in SHARED 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A PATH TO ENGAGED EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 231 (Frank Shipper ed., 2014). 
 154 Naercio Menezes-Filho et al., Unions and the Economic Performance of Brazilian Establish-
ments 31 (Inter-American Development Bank, Research Network Working Paper #R-464 2001). 
 155 Donald A. McGrath, Human Resources: A Comparative Look at the Legal and Tax Environ-
ment for Motivating and Compensating People in the United States and Canada, 16 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 
125 (1990). 
 156 Linden Spencer, A Correlation Analysis Between Employee Theft and Employee Ownership 
(2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Phoenix) (on file with the University of Phoe-
nix Library system). 
 157 Sarah Brown et al., Absenteeism and Employee Sharing: An Empirical Analysis Based on 
French Panel Data, 1981–1991, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 234 (1999). 
 158 Shlomo Benartzi et al., The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 50 J. L. 
& ECON. 53 (2007). 
 159 See, e.g., Derek C. Jones et al., The Productivity Effects of Stock Option Schemes: Evidence 
from Finnish Panel Data, 33 J. PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 67 (2010). 
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same 1/N limitations, has no definitive impact on executive perfor-
mance or profitability.160 
Similarly, EO proponents focus on intracorporate monitoring costs 
of both employees and managers as one vector for improved productiv-
ity in EO companies.161 This leads to better disclosure for all corporate 
stakeholders,162 as well as reduced coordination costs.163 Such assump-
tions render plausible the argument that EO stabilizes companies and 
improves firm survival over time.164 Packaged together, such assump-
tions can be generalized into a theoretical model of EO superiority.165 
To varying degrees, critics concede these points, but, again, can use sur-
vivalist logic to argue that the relevant size effects are small or coun-
terbalance by other costs associated with EO arrangements.166 
The best example of the survivalist position is Henry Hansmann’s 
now-classic critique of ESOPs, which he then developed into a general 
critique of employee ownership.167 In justifying his position, Hansmann 
takes all pro-EO arguments seriously and does not deny their theoreti-
cal coherence or empirical validation. But he does offer what many have 
found to be the compelling explanation for why EO is not more exten-
sive, and why EO-promotion is likely to fail: heterogeneity costs. Hans-
mann’s central argument is that most employees do not have similar 
 
 160 See Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Colleen Honigsberg, The Hidden Nature of Executive Retire-
ment Pay, 100 VA. L. REV. 479 (2014). It is also relevant that most of the regulatory reaction against 
stock options as a form of executive compensation has similarly impacted the functioning of share 
plans for all employees. 
 161 Alejandro Suarez, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Solution or a Hindrance to the 
Search for a Representative and Productive Style of Employee Ownership, 2 BUS. L.J. 131 (1991); 
see also Sangsoo Park & Moon H. Song, Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 24 FIN. MGMT 52 (1995); 
John Peter Daley, Employee Stock Ownership Incentives and Contracting Efficiency, with Evi-
dence from Employee Stock Ownership Plan Adopters (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Washington) (on filed with the University of Washington Library system). 
 162 Peter M. Hall, Meta-Power, Social Organization, and the Shaping of Social Action, 20 
SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 397 (1997); Francesco Bova et al., Employee Ownership and Firm Disclo-
sure, 32 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 639 (2015). 
 163 Russell Yankwitt, Buy Me Some Peanuts and Ownership: Major League Baseball and the 
Need for Employee Ownership, 5 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 401 (1996). 
 164 Margaret M. Blair et al., Employee Ownership: An Unstable Form or a Stabilizing Force, in 
THE NEW RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 241 (Margaret M. Blair 
& Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000). 
 165 Chong-en Bai & Chenggang Xu, Does Employee Ownership Improve Incentives for Efforts 
(LSE STICERD Theoretical Economics Working Paper TE/01/413, 1996). 
 166 Hansmann’s pattern of acknowledgement and rebuttal is repeated by Stephen Bainbridge, 
who addresses many of the monitoring and informational claims of pro-worker participation schol-
ars but then ultimately concludes they are limited by the decision-making problems they would 
simultaneously produce. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management, 23 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 979 (1998). 
 167 Hansmann’s series of articles on ESOPs and EO were recollected and extended in HENRY 
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996) 
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interests, especially in larger enterprises. Especially as companies to-
day are more geographically dispersed and employ workers in a variety 
of often distinct enterprises, solidarity of worker interest is unlikely and 
potential voting coordination even more so. Variations in employee skill 
levels make compensation one obvious area where conflicts can arise as 
easily among employees as between employees and managers.168 
Hansmann’s heterogeneity position also pushes him to look at com-
panies generally excluded by EO researchers, which are technically em-
ployee-owned because they are naturally homogenous, such as profes-
sional firms. His example of the sale of Lehman Brothers to American 
Express also shows how a once homogenous entity can develop inter-
nally heterogeneous divisions, in this case a generational split between 
traders, and thus need to be reconstituted as a non-partnership.169 
Hansmann thus does not need to be dismissive of pro-EO argu-
ments in order to undermine their ultimate conclusions. For example, 
many pro-EO scholars argue that employees, especially in larger corpo-
rations, have a longer time horizon for evaluating corporate decisions, 
and thus are better positioned than the short-termism that dominates 
managerial incentives.170 Hansmann could acknowledge this, but 
simply argues that, to the extent it can be proven, such longer time ho-
rizons actually generate more acute divisions via intra-employee heter-
ogeneity (such as new hires and retirees). A pro-EO study can be cited 
that ties increasing effects of EO on retail sales firms,171 to which Hans-
mann could retort that such effects could be replicated better with tar-
geted commission-based pay structures without the distorting effects of 
coordinating the conflicting interests of sales and non-sales staff. 
The power of Hansmann’s heterogeneity argument is directly pro-
portional to the intensity of the EO conundrum regarding ownership 
and participation. He directly cites the lack of worker participation in 
ESOPs as a negative example that ownership with such diversified de-
cision-making leads to better outcomes.172 Hansmann can then also 
 
 168 Henry Hansmann, The Viability of Worker Ownership, in THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF TREATIES 
171 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1990). 
 169 Hansmann, supra note 4, at 1808. 
 170 Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short–Termism and Managerial Myopia, 100 KY. 
L. J. 531 (2011). 
 171 See Brent Kramer, Employee Ownership and Participation Effects on Firms Outcomes in 
Firms Majority Employee-Owned Through Employee Stock Ownership Plans in the US, 31 ECON. 
& INDUS. DEMOCRACY 449 (2010). 
 172 Hansmann also claims that there is “considerable circumstantial evidence” that such par-
ticipation is costly. However, this is the weakest empirical assertion in his argument and is directly 
rebutted by the baseline performance neutrality established by the vast majority of empirical EO 
studies. Hansmann, supra note 4, at 1802. 
12 KRONCKE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  11:26 AM 
318  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
point to the limited actual participation by workers in ESOPs as a fea-
ture, rather than a flaw, in what success they have achieved.173 
The force of the heterogeneity theory thus persists even with new 
rounds of positive empirical work by EO scholars. The minority status 
of EO companies in the current corporate ecology coupled with the weak 
theoretical link between actual ownership and EO company outcomes 
give little reason to convert for those not already committed to EO for 
ideological reasons. As the bulk of the quantitative EO research is 
caught up battling over results with relatively small size effects—sig-
nificance issues aside—it is easier to take the opposition’s points as true 
but minor, and the revealed preference of the market as de facto evi-
dence that even multiple vectors of EO benefits are holistically under-
whelming. In sum, underlying the endogeneity problem is the simple 
fact that if EO is so conclusively positive, then why don’t more compa-
nies adopt, even with zero or slight tax advantages? 
D. Republicanism and the Conundrum’s Ecological Impasse 
The elision of EO scholarship regarding the ownership/participa-
tion axis of the conundrum itself reflects the particular terrain on which 
Kelso set the stage of its American instantiation. The use of quantita-
tive methods to show that EO is better for profitability is understanda-
ble as a defensive move against critiques, but over time this reliance 
has severely narrowed the radicalism of employee ownership’s republi-
can roots. Why is profitability the end point of the argument? Economic 
republicans didn’t argue for the centrality of ownership concepts be-
cause they thought it would lead to greater growth (though some did). 
Their primary motivation was a particular concept of economic citizen-
ship grounded on notions of personal independence and social power, or 
simply antisubordination.174 Liberty and efficiency were rarely enemies 
in early American political economy, but there were certainly not bed-
fellows. 
Kelso’s intrasystemic focus already conceded the first axis of the 
EO conundrum that actual economic republicanism struggled with at 
the turn of the twentieth century: can change occur from within the 
logic of the existing wage-based system? Resistance of early republicans 
to wage labor or stock ownership plans reflected the republican integra-
tion of political and economic life, not a dogged determination to show 
 
 173 Id. at 1799. 
 174 See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: 
From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (1994). 
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that it was equally efficient to the authoritarian workplace they saw 
persistently rife with feudal social assumptions. 
This is not to say that EO scholarship has not been useful. It has 
shown that the predictions of systemic dysfunction predicted by mana-
gerial triumphalists are greatly overstated. But it has reached the point 
where it can only invoke republican norms at the highest level of gen-
erality. And it prematurely concedes ground when high-EO concentra-
tions might in fact inhibit aggregate growth, but are still consonant 
with republican ideals. 
Take, for example, capital mobility. The increasingly rapid and 
transnational free flow of non-human capital allows it to seek out the 
highest ROI settings with global range and proactively engage in regu-
latory arbitrage. By contrast, an EO company is not going to reallocate 
its capital to another country simply to marginally increase ROI. The 
recent controversy over the relocation of the U.S. manufacturing oper-
ations of Carrier Corporation to Mexico rearticulated exactly these con-
cerns.175 The company had enjoyed recurrent and ongoing profitability, 
but still sought further returns through its relocation plan. Fighting 
this battle on an econometric terrain is always going to fail. What is 
needed is an explicitly political, value based-grounding that is far more 
secure in its concept of economic citizenship. Sociological work can spec-
ify how the severe velocity mismatch of economic and social capital dis-
rupts communities and forces costs on workers that atomistic, income-
based analysis cannot capture.176 However, the weighing of such costs 
is always going to reflect a set of political choices. 
Such clarity would require a much closer fit between arguments for 
policies based on ownership ideals and the actual underlying antisub-
ordination values of republicanism. This is no small challenge, as while 
recourse to highly abstract notions of citizenship are persuasive to 
some, operationalizing them is far more difficult—as the ESOP example 
again so clearly shows. Moving to develop a tighter framing first re-
quires that economic republicans can in some basic way evaluate and 
identify what they want in practice. 
This difficulty is parallel to the search in development theory writ 
large for new conceptual framings, trying to turn away from GDP 
growth to concepts such as “human flourishing” or “capabilities.”177 No 
shortage of labor scholars has searched for substitute evaluative rubrics 
 
 175 IBJ Staff, Carrier Plans to Lay Off 1,400 Indy Workers in Mexico Move, IND. BUS. J. (Feb. 
10, 2016), http://www.ibj.com/articles/57162-carrier-plans-to-lay-off-1400-indy-workers-in-mexico-
move [https://perma.cc/QC6Z-93GV]. 
 176 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, OUR KIDS: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN CRISIS (2015). 
 177 See Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, THE QUALITY OF LIFE 1–6 (1993); Amartya Sen, 
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
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to justify their reform agendas, such as dignity.178 Progressive corporate 
law scholars also wrestle with establishing the existence and degree of 
social externalities in corporate governance, and even creatively rede-
ploy intangible property frameworks.179 Ownership concepts have even 
been worked into human rights and other development discourse, but 
still a high level of generality.180 
Moving the EO debate to grapple with similar issues would require 
a fundamental change in EO framing that perhaps all of its current ad-
herents would not share. It would involve risking exactly the type of 
easy, but shallow, bi-partisanship that ESOPs evidence so well. Much 
of Kelso’s success was finding a place for EO in the Cold War era where 
any sustained critique of American economic practices was met with 
almost instant red-baiting. But the virtuous philosopher-entrepreneurs 
who Kelso imagined would take up his ESOP to transform American 
capitalism never emerged, and those that did quite often draped them-
selves with EO to signal virtue rather than to make any personal sacri-
fice to realize a new form of economic citizenship. 
Re-grounding the republican values as the motivator of EO work 
would allow proponents to take seriously the traditional labor move-
ment’s skepticism about financial inclusion, not for its economic effects, 
but for its political consequences.181 And in doing so, EO work would 
prevent itself from falling so far down the productivity rabbit hole to 
where it loses all of its connection to the lived experiences of workers. 
The private, gradual and non-conflictual transformation that Kelso im-
agined that the ESOP would unleash has never come to fruition exactly 
because no genius of pure legal innovation can escape politics. 
This type of reconstructive project requires more than just a reaf-
firmation of republican values. It would require two distinct and quali-
tative developments within the field: 1) clarity about the specific work-
place dynamics and structures that reflect republican values distinct 
from ownership itself, and 2) developing an ecological regulatory sensi-
bility for developing specific legal and institutional reforms to allow 
 
 178 RANDY HODSON, DIGNITY AT WORK 3 (2001). 
 179 Margaret M. Blair, Closing the Theory Gap: How the Economic Theory of Property Rights 
Can Help Bring “Stakeholders” Back into Theories of the Firm, 9 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 33 
(2005). 
 180 Steve Clem, Transnational Corporations, International Agencies/Organizations and Em-
ployee Ownership Policy (July 16, 2009), http://www.oeockent.org/download/general_articles_ 
on_employee_ownership/transnational.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRF5-FWF3]. 
 181 Compare MICHAEL BURAWOY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: CHANGES IN THE LABOR PROCESS 
UNDER MONOPOLY CAPITALISM (1979) with Randy Hodson et al., Is Worker Solidarity Undermined 
by Autonomy and Participation? Patterns from the Ethnographic Literature, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 398 
(1993). 
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meaningful EO to spread while addressing survivalist arguments. Fur-
thermore, the development of an economy truly grounded in republican 
norms of freedom will require a far more systemic intervention in cor-
porate formation, and one that may never emerge without a sustained 
social movement that makes reshaping workplace power a priority. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE SHALLOW GENIUS OF THE ESOP 
Likely one of the largest gaps between those approving of and those 
critical of modern labor relations is their consideration of the pivotal 
assumption of economic republicanism: that economic and political cit-
izenship are inextricably linked. One would not expect, for example, for 
an authoritarian political regime to have any desire to promote eco-
nomic republican norms. Authoritarian regimes are, in fact, deeply 
wary of labor movements exactly because they fear the slippage from 
economic to political solidarity.182 Recognizing, or not recognizing, this 
linkage is most consequential as democratic theories of political citizen-
ship are uncontroversially concerned with issues of power between var-
ious social actors. And the relationship of citizens to the state is just one 
of these critical dyads, and one which is often more remote in daily life 
than that among employees and employers.183 Concepts of the work-
place that necessarily elide issues of power are thus required to see em-
ployees only as fungible inputs whose complete value is best set by the 
pricing mechanism of a labor market.184 Commodities do not need eco-
nomic citizenship. 
The lesson of the ESOP is then one of good intentions gone awry, 
but exactly because it sought to solve by technical sleight a problem 
concerned with the social distribution of power. It also represents a par-
ticular challenge to the property-centric concept of economic republi-
canism. Ownership itself is a means to the end goal of economic liberty, 
not a good onto itself. Even if the relationship of a worker to their work-
place is completely reconceived in terms of property rather than ex-
change, this achieves nothing if this shift does not lead to a redistribu-
tion of power within the firm.185 This reality is one reason why there is 
little evidence that fractionalized ownership in the workplace leads to 
 
 182 Jedidiah J. Kroncke, Property Rights, Labor Rights, and, Democratization: Lessons from 
China and Experimental Authoritarians, 46 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 115 (2013). 
 183 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (2017). 
 184 Representatively, Hansmann approvingly cites how corporations are structured with “the 
functional purpose of avoiding some of the pitfalls of the democratic process.” Henry Hansmann, 
Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 589, 603 (1993). 
 185 Robert N. Stern & Tove Helland Hammer, Employee Ownership: Implications for the Or-
ganizational Distribution of Power, 23 ACAD. MGMT. J. 78 (1980). 
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greater political participation,186 or the development of more transform-
ative economic ideals by workers.187 
The inability of employee ownership scholarship to speak convinc-
ingly to the contemporary anxiety over economic inequality and legiti-
macy reflects how thoroughly undermined the field has been by its his-
torical bargain in the United States for the appearance of apoliticism. 
Perhaps no better indicator is the extent to which human resource man-
agement studies have taken over the field in recent decades.188 HRM 
studies explicitly articulate that the power of ESOP and other share 
schemes is to make workers feel empowered enough to improve their 
motivation,189 but are content with a near-Orwellian aspiration to 
achieve such motivation without actually allowing workers to interfere 
with managerial discretion.190 Even pro-ESOP scholars like Blasi and 
Kruse recognize that their efficiency-based arguments about worker 
motivation are inherently predicated only on psychological perception, 
not direct worker power.191 
If this article is seen as unkind to ESOP proponents, it is important 
to note that much of the technocratic seriousness with which they ap-
proach the subject of economic liberty is matched by the often-non-tech-
nical seriousness with which more radical workplace visions are ad-
vanced. There are strong unresolved tensions among labor law critics 
about the relative importance of autonomy versus voice in the work-
 
 186 ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 97 (1985). 
 187 See EDWARD GREENBERG, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF 
PARTICIPATION (1986); JEFFREY BERRY et al., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 259 (1993); see 
also CHRISTOPHER EATON GUNN, WORKERS’ SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 170 (1984). 
 188 See, e.g., Michael Aiken et al., Organizational Structure, Work Process, and Proposal Mak-
ing in Administrative Bureaucracies, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 631 (1980); Eric C.A. Kaarsemaker & 
Erik Poutsma, The Fit of Employee Ownership with Other Human Resource Management Practices: 
Theoretical and Empirical Suggestions Regarding the Existence of an Ownership High-Perfor-
mance Work System, 27 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 669 (2006). 
 189 Katharine Klein & Rosalie Hall, Correlates of Employee Satisfaction with Stock Ownership: 
Who Likes an ESOP Most?, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 630 (1988); Katherine Klein, Employee Stock 
Ownership and Employee Attitudes: A Test of Three Models, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 319 (1987); 
see also Richard J. Long, Employee Profit Sharing: Consequences and Moderators, 55 INDUS. REL. 
477 (2000). 
 190 Jon Pierce et al., Employee Ownership: A Conceptual Model of Process and Effects, 16 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 121 (1991); Jon Pierce et al., Toward a Theory of Psychological Ownership in Organ-
izations, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 298, 308 (2001); Jon Pierce & Donald Gardner, Self-Esteem Within 
the Work and Organizational Context: A Review of the Organization-Based Self-Esteem Literature, 
30 J. MGMT. 591 (2004); Derek Jones et al., How Does Employee Involvement Stack Up? The Effects 
of Human Resource Management Policies on Performance in a Retail Firm, 49 INDUS. REL. 1 (2010). 
 191 See, e.g., Kruse & Blasi, supra note 61, at 11 (“Employee ownership may have positive ef-
fects if employees value ownership in itself or perceive that it brings greater income, job security, 
or control over jobs and the workplace. On the other hand, it may have negligible or even negative 
effects if employees perceive no different in their work lives.”). 
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place, as well as the role of specific expertise in workplace manage-
ment.192 Much of the activist-driven labor cooperative movement ex-
presses near utopian visions of human nature, and argues that simple 
transparency is all that is required for any worker to fully and equally 
participate in corporate decision-making.193 This ideology of non-hier-
archy runs deep, and sits uneasily with any form of differential exper-
tise or representative decision-making.194 As such, EO scholarship 
rarely acknowledges any concern for forms of horizontal subordination 
in cooperative workplaces,195 or consideration that full participation in 
all levels of governance may not be the aspiration of every worker.196 
This concern with technical seriousness is also key to understand-
ing the failure of the ESOP as not simply some sort of secretive anti-
worker ploy. It is a clarion example of how no ideal model of worker 
empowerment can be evaluated simply by its own internal logic, but 
requires understanding its interaction with the larger regulatory ecol-
ogy in which it exists. The almost complete standstill in ESOP growth 
after the owner tax roll-over benefit was removed is telling of the capac-
ity for purely voluntary capital expansion. Nevertheless, a great deal of 
the intra-ESOP literature correctly identifies many of the core issues in 
systemic replication that face any alternative workplace institution 
that operates outside of the current corporate norm.197 
This is the heart of Jeffrey Hirsch’s critique of Hansmann’s surviv-
alist thesis, where Hirsch notes that revealed preference arguments 
presume that current corporate structures are not dependent on a 
whole host of other regulatory design choices.198 In practical terms, the 
 
 192 Orly Lobel & Anne Marie Lofaso, Systems of Employee Representation: The US Report, in 
SYSTEMS OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION AT THE ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Roger 
Blanpain et al. eds., 2012); see also JOHN W. BUDD, EMPLOYMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE: BALANCING 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND VOICE (2004). 
 193 Joyce Rothschild, The Logic of a Co-Operative Economy and Democracy 2.0: Recovering the 
Possibilities for Autonomy, Creativity, Solidarity, and Common Purpose, 57 SOC. Q. 7, 10 (2016) 
(“In response to Schumpeterian fears that the people do not know enough to govern, participants 
in the new social movements and co-operative economy answer with their insistence that all rele-
vant information and relationships be shared with the group at hand, and an Internet age makes 
this far more plausible than it once was.”). 
 194 Carmen Huertas-Noble, Promoting Worker-Owned Cooperatives as a CED Empowerment 
Strategy: A Case Study of Colors and Lawyering in Support of Participatory Decision-Making and 
Meaningful Social Change, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 255 (2010). 
 195 Richard B. Freeman, Worker Responses to Shirking Under Shared Capitalism, in SHARED 
CAPITALISM AT WORK 77 (Douglas L. Kruse et al. eds., 2010). 
 196 Robert Bussel, “Business Without a Boss”: The Columbia Conserve Company and Workers’ 
Control, 1917-1943, 71 BUS. HIST. REV. 417 (1997). 
 197 DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: HOW BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN 
BOTH WIN (1995); see Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899 (2014). 
 198 Specifically, for Hirsch’s arguments about ESOPs, the choice under the NRLA regime to 
ban company unions is one such pre-existing regulatory choice that could easily be reversed. See 
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creation of the ESOP as an intrasystemic innovation did solve key ques-
tions that plague cooperative workplaces, such as access to credit (both 
at the initial buy-in stage and later based on outside evaluators’ abili-
ties to understand their business models) and their interaction with dis-
pute resolution forums like the judiciary (which have developed doc-
trines over time based on economic forms with different agency 
structures). 
In this vein, if one is to move beyond simply imagining workplace 
institutions that validate norms of economic republicanism and toward 
an agenda for systemic change, then much of the existing ESOP litera-
ture is instructive to the extent that it emphasizes the need for alterna-
tive workplaces to form, fail and reconstitute as easily as extant corpo-
rate forms. If every alternative workplace requires huge start-up costs 
alongside significant employee self-sacrifice then their ability to repli-
cate will be severely deadened. 
One of the lessons of the ESOP literature is that worker and man-
ager human capital formation is often a pre-social reality as it concerns 
the new ESOP. If those with specific managerial expertise are trained 
to run different sorts of companies, it is difficult to undo these years of 
training.199 Similarly, if workers are trained in a system/society that 
presumes a need for civic education for political participation, but no 
specific education for economic participation, then many of the issues 
with worker governance become self-fulfilling.200 
For example, when Posner wrote about ESOPs after his decision in 
Summers, he rearticulated Hansmann’s presumption that workers 
would always exhibit harmful short-termism by opting for opportunistic 
over-compensation rather than long-term investments in their compa-
nies.201 It is not so much that this claim is definitively empirically un-
true, as much of the ESOP literature struggles with means to shift 
workers into an “owner mentality” that prioritizes longer-term decision-
 
Jeffrey Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and Implementation of Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other “Survivalists”, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 957 (1998); see also Michelle Welsh et al., The End of the ‘End of History for Corporate Law?’, 
29 AUSTRL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2014). 
 199 Peter M. Hall, Meta-Power, Social Organization, and the Shaping of Social Action, 20 
SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 397 (1997). 
 200 Robert S. Tart, The Fabled ESOP, WM. & MARY ANN. TAX CONF. 83, 99 (1975). 
 201 Richard Posner, The Economics of ESOPs—Posner’s Comment, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Apr. 
8, 2007), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2007/04/the-economics-of-esops—posners-comment. 
html [https://perma.cc/R7GZ-KAHW] (“A worker will trade off any long-term benefits to the corpo-
ration from a corporate action that would increase the value of his shares against whatever short-
term benefits, in the form of a higher salary or greater fringe benefits or a lighter workload, an 
alternative course of action would confer on him; and usually the tradeoff will favor increased 
compensation for work over increased stock value.”); Henry Hansmann, supra note 4, at 1772. 
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making.202 The real question is whether this must be true, or simply 
reflects the consequences of the dominant paradigm of worker subordi-
nation. One valuable remainder from the ESOP movement was efforts, 
primarily at the public level, to create sectoral or multi-company train-
ing initiatives to reduce the cost of training nonmanagerial employees 
in basic corporate practices.203 While public expenditures on such efforts 
were and are miniscule in comparison to the tax expenditures directed 
toward ESOP formation, they provide some precedent for looking out-
side the corporation for complementary reforms. 
This more ecological view of reform may seem more ambitious than 
is achievable in the current historical moment. It still squarely presents 
the issue of where EO scholars truly committed to economic republican-
ism should focus their efforts. It is hard to walk back decade-long strat-
egies after seeing the bipartisan potential of ESOPs, but their variation 
of ownership without voice or power is now a trap that has been tainted 
by far too many abuses. The appeal of gradualist approaches seems ever 
more reasonable than more radical changes, but the continued mar-
ginal utility of making intracorporate arguments about efficiency seem 
to have turned negative. No matter how appealing or historically reso-
nant the rhetoric of ownership may be, it is rendered tangential to work-
place antisubordination when actuated through fractional forms. And 
to the extent that the ESOP phenomenon continues to only heap greater 
rewards on existing economic success, it risks alienating employee own-
ership promotion from the type of labor movement that would be re-
quired for more systematic change. There is still great potential in the 
resonance of economic republicanism in the otherwise reform-adverse 
arenas of American politics, but a higher standard is required to judge 
what type of reforms will render this resonance truly productive for eco-
nomic liberty. 
 
 202 See generally, CHRISTOPHER EATON GUNN, WORKERS’ SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 35 (1984); Valerie Hensen, Understanding Employee Ownership: A Sense-Making Ap-
proach (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico) (on file with the Uni-
versity of New Mexico Library system). 
 203 LOGUE & YATES, supra note 38, at 167. 
